

Christianity and Crisis

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William Temple

THE choice of William Temple as Archbishop of Canterbury is not only a fitting honor for the greatest leader among the non-Roman Churches, but it is also striking evidence of spiritual health within the Anglican Church and the British nation. It is always surprising when one who combines so conspicuously the gifts of the thinker with the insight and courage of the prophet is elevated to high office in the Church and in the world. It has been suggested that his selection was the result of democratic social forces which are so powerful in British life, of which Sir Stafford Cripps is another representative, rather than of the wishes of the majority of the clergy who would have chosen a "safer" man. Whether or not this is so we cannot say, but it is certain that whatever kind of man the clergy might have chosen, they cannot fail to recognize the actual spiritual primacy of Archbishop Temple in the Church regardless of his office. And it is also certain that in making Temple Archbishop of Canterbury notice has been given that those who believe in the existence of a new and more democratic Britain are right.

The comment has been made that Temple goes not from York to Canterbury, but from Malvern to Canterbury. The Malvern Conference has become the symbol in this country of the radical social criticism and the belief in radical social reconstruction which have always been central in Temple's vision. For many years he was President of the Workers' Education Association which is one of the sources of the superior political sophistication of British as compared with American Labor. His heart has been in the British Labor movement. It is difficult to label his position for there is nothing of the social dogmatist about him. In temper he is a moderate, but his criticisms of contemporary Capitalism are radical. He is emphatically on the side of the forces that are making for a truly democratic economic and social order in Britain and he can be counted on to strike many a blow against the economic and the feudal obstacles to that development. His outlook is controlled in part by his strong sense of the limits of the com-

petence of the Church in dealing with the technical aspects of economic and political questions. He has said that it is the business of Lambeth, not to dictate to Westminster, but "to remind Westminster of its responsibilities to God." In view of his past record we can expect Lambeth, without dogmatism concerning concrete solutions, to point out to Westminster where it most conspicuously fails to heed its responsibilities to God and in what direction it can discover most light concerning those responsibilities. But more important than direct influence upon Westminster will be the Archbishop's ceaseless efforts to bring the mind of the Church to a clearer understanding of the meaning of Christian faith for society and for the re-ordering of its own life.

Archbishop Temple will help the British people and the people of the United States to preserve their sanity during the war and to plan for a just peace. Temple believes as strongly as any man in the importance of defeating the Axis, but he has consistently maintained a Christian perspective on the war. He has transcended the passions of the nation in his public prayers and in all of his statements. He has personally given leadership to the preparation for post-war reconstruction, and he has taken a strong stand in favor of world political organization at the expense of the sovereignty of existing nations. He can be expected to oppose to the end the tendency to assume that the Germans as a nation are congenitally barbarous, a tendency which has become known in England as Vansittartism because of the opinions of Lord Vansittart. Temple believes that Germany must have defeat brought home to her from a military and political point of view, but he hopes that the German people as persons may be liberated at the same time and that within a few years Germany can take her place as an equal among the nations. Toward Russia Temple has been open and sympathetic. He did not wait until June 1941 to say that Communism is far superior to Fascism. He has never shared the fear of Communism that distorted the outlook of powerful groups in England but he does realize even now that

the lack of a common background of Christian and democratic assumptions will be a difficult problem in working with Russia in the future.

We have stressed Archbishop Temple's leadership in public life because we believe that his new position of influence is one of the most hopeful factors in the world today. But Temple is also the greatest theologian in the Church of England. His Gifford Lectures, published under the title, *Nature, Man and God*, written during years of intense activity, rank among the richest volumes in that famous series. He is an irenic thinker with a vigorous point of view of his own. He has achieved an extraordinary breadth of mind without sacrificing consistency and incisiveness. For this reason, whenever he is within reach, he has the task of drafting the documents produced by committees and conferences. For this reason, also, he is fitted by the qualities of his mind to be the leader of the Ecumenical Movement. Temple has a naturally buoyant faith in the coherence of all experience from the Christian point of view. In mood he is very different from those Christian thinkers who see first of all darkness and contradiction in the world, but his

very breadth and sympathy make it possible for him to see the problems to which these other thinkers point and to include them in his vision. It is, however, hard to imagine a mind possessed by a more radiant and assured conviction that all things in human life and thought can be brought into captivity to Christ.

Archbishop Temple's influence owes much to the fact that he is loved as a human being wherever he is known. There is not a trace of ecclesiastical or national or personal pride in his nature. He is a favorite with the younger generation and the younger generation is a favorite with him. He has won the confidence of the non-Conformist Churches in England. He will do much to enable Britain to show a side of herself to America which has always been there, but which has often been hidden by what Americans have regarded, frequently unfairly, as British presumption. Some of his admirers have feared that his new position will link him so closely with the British government that he will be less free and less effective as a leader of the World Church. But if this difficulty exists, we can trust William Temple to transcend it.

J. C. B.

The Small Nations and European Reconstruction

PHILIP E. MOSELY

IN THE midst of a world-wide war, it is easy to forget that one of the roots of the conflict lies in a centuries-old clash of interest and of opinion concerning the proper place of the smaller peoples in the European scheme of things. In the struggle for oceans and continents, the problem of Europe—the problem of the coexistence of large and small nations—is temporarily in eclipse. But, when the fighting is over, the victors will be confronted again by the riddle of how peoples of vastly different strength can live together in a crowded continent.

Down to the end of the seventeenth century small and compact states had many advantages in their rivalry with great empires; in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries some small states were safeguarded in their existence by the balancing of the rivalries of the great powers. The war of 1914-18 first showed how greatly this sense of security had become an illusion, in view of the great disparity of the effects of industrialization and of nationalism on the large and the small nation. Since 1933 the problem of the sur-

vival of the smaller nations has been stated with a brutal insistence which will no longer be denied its answer.

One school of thought would have it that the small nation has no future. In a world ruled by force, only large and powerful units can hope to assert their right to survive. A nation whose territory can be overrun in a few days of lightning-war, whose entire population may be no greater than that of some metropolis of a larger country, and whose area and resources do not permit the development of all-round industrial power, cannot expect to survive in the traditional form of the sovereign state. Such a view was self-evident to the supporters of *Mitteleuropa*, and it is a basic tenet of the Geo-politicians of today. It spells the death of the small nations, unless the hegemon power decides, in its own interest, to leave to them some sphere of domestic autonomy.

The dream of a German "leadership of Europe," which Hitler has proclaimed as one of the more modest goals of his war, can perhaps be fulfilled through

the continued and increasing exercise of force upon the peoples which his armies or his diplomacy have subjugated, or through the conquered resigning themselves to an indeterminate future of Nazi neo-slavery. Can the Dutch, Norwegians, Czechs, or Poles, to mention only four of the conquered nations, be reconciled to Hitler's "new order"? Theoretically, over several generations, through the destruction of the high-spirited and the intelligent, through the survival of "adapters" and compromisers, even a cultured and proud people might forget its history. But, living on an old soil, with reminders of their past achievements everywhere about them, shut off by a wall of injustice and arrogance from their conquerors, the peoples now overrun cannot, in the foreseeable future, be ground down to nation-less human dust.

Psychology of Nazi Rule

Hitler's Assyrian-night's dream of reducing all the non-German peoples to a nameless mass of slaves would appear merely as one more nightmare of a restless Europe, were it not for the cunning with which he has gone about buttressing his rule. By creating a system of privileged castes above castes he has made a bold appeal to deep-seated instincts of inequality, instincts which have had a longer history than has the Christian-Stoic, humanitarian-democratic ideal of human equality. Within the German people itself Hitler has anchored his power in a new caste-system which compensates even the lowest caste of Germans for its loss of human rights through the luxury of being allowed to despise still lower castes of non-Germans and "non-Aryans." Within certain sections of the peoples conquered or marked down for conquest, Hitler has fostered similar delusions of superiority and domination. In nearly every country he has found a few individuals who preferred the prospect of being associated with the Germanic "master-race" in tyranny over their own countrymen to the defense of the unity and identity of their people. Despite these transitory successes in applying the maxim of "divide and rule," the sound instinct of the European peoples rejects the Nazi witches' brew. Their resistance to the poison is all the stronger since the best that Hitler offers them within his "new order" is the lowly position of "industrial cannon-fodder." This factor, apart from considerations of national, religious and human dignity, would long keep them inwardly hostile to his system. If the genuine reconciliation of the smaller peoples to Hitler's rule is all but impossible, only two courses are open to the Nazis: the extermination or the assimilation of the "lesser breeds."

The method of extermination is, unfortunately, only too accessible. By pressing his finger on the jugular vein of the food-supply, Hitler has already inflicted indescribable sufferings upon the conquered

peoples. In addition, a price of blood is being exacted from the defeated nations for having dared to resist. Despite the enforced separation from their homes of prisoners of war and of laborers recruited through hunger, despite the grinding down of entire nations below the level of bare subsistence, the permanent impairment of the human resources of the European peoples will not necessarily follow. Once Hitler's rule is overthrown, and tolerable conditions of life and work are restored, the now subject peoples will reassert their will to live with that resilience which Europe has shown after earlier catastrophes. Finally, complete extermination can hardly be combined with Hitler's aim of perpetuating the subject populations as obedient *Sklavenvölker*, bound to the service of his world-wide ambitions.

The path of assimilation has a longer and more honorable tradition behind it. In the Middle Ages and sporadically in more recent times, the Germans, like other European peoples, have displayed a remarkable power of assimilation. This achievement of earlier centuries is now invoked to deny to other European peoples the right to a national life of their own. The time has passed when Germany can assimilate any but a few scattered individuals, and Hitler has recognized that fact by abandoning the assimilationist tradition of Germany's eastward movement.

If the smaller nations of Europe cannot be destroyed biologically, nor assimilated culturally and linguistically, then the Nazis' jerry-built structure of caste-rule, so long as it stands, will rest on a very shaky scaffolding. Hitler can never feel secure in his new slave-state until the conquered have given up hope of being released from the Nazi strait-jacket by the remaining free peoples of the Euro-American world. The logic of fear has driven Hitler on, to attempt to destroy Britain, Russia, and America. Because of the counter-logic of the struggle, and because their own safety demands it, Britain and the United States, with the assent of Russia, have set as one of their purposes the restoration to national life of the conquered peoples of Europe. Point Two of the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, proclaims that Britain and the United States "desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." Point Three states that "they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

The Atlantic Charter, supplemented by other declarations, has set up these and related principles as a broad guide to the post-war reconstruction. There will be little quarrel within the camp of the United Nations over the principle of national self-determina-

tion. Uncertainties are more likely to arise concerning the future safeguarding of the principle. However, there are some hopeful signs that after this war the great sea-powers are less likely to dismiss the problem of implementing intra-European security with a self-righteous reference to "old-world mentality" and with a vague hope for a "change of heart" within the German people.

Relation of Allied Powers to Post-war Europe

In turn, the peoples of the European continent will be much more concerned with the future relationship of Britain, Russia, and the United States to the maintenance of European order than with the character of the post-war regime in Germany. Within a continent which, Russia apart, has been deprived of self-determination as much by its own divisions as by Germany's strength and strategy, post-war arrangements will be shaped in very large measure through adaptation to the policies, so far as they may be defined or predicted, of the great extra-European, or mainly extra-European, powers. In no question is the riddle of the future aims and attitudes of the ultimate victors, especially of the most powerful and most unpredictable of them all—the United States—more serious than in the problem of the future of the smaller nations of Europe.

If the policies of the United States, of Russia, and of Great Britain and the Commonwealth should again be shaped by a post-war revulsion against European complexities and commitments, the non-German peoples of Europe would certainly feel obliged to secure drastic guarantees against a recrudescence of Germany's lust for hegemony. In this case, Hitler's present victims would claim to be both judge and executor of whatever system of security they might consider necessary, a system of security which the extra-European victors would, in this assumption, neither buttress nor weaken. This solution would require the immediate revival of the French, Polish, and other military traditions and power, as instruments for its enforcement. As a means of destroying Germany's geographical advantages, this solution would carry with it a drastic rearrangement of the map, the loss of the Rhineland, of East Prussia, and of Upper Silesia by the *Reich*, which would also be required to receive all German populations living beyond the new frontiers. For an indefinite period all German territory would be occupied by the armies of the now subject nations, which would also apply Hitler's own methods of economic exploitation to extract from Germany a partial compensation for the Nazis' plunderings.

This solution would probably be effective for a considerable time to come, for it would rest on a common memory of Nazi-created misery and humiliation.

The main danger to it would be that, when the will to enforce the victory had slackened, as it might slacken under the impact of domestic problems, of a realization of Germany's new helplessness, and of a tendency to form new groupings among the restored nations, the collective will to hold Germany down might be relaxed. The extreme solution would be based on an assumption that Germans must be left outside the pale of common humanity; it would thus undermine within the German people whatever traditions and interests might otherwise draw it again into the community of peoples. The resulting picture of European hatreds and turmoil is not a pretty one to contemplate. Nor is it at all certain that the extra-continental victors, even if they could wash their hands of responsibility for the political future of continental Europe, would remain unaffected by the economic and social repercussions of a policy which left the future of that part of the world solely in the hands of Hitler's victims.

Exiled Governments and Post-war Reconstruction

Fully conscious of the uncertainties of post-war American, British, and Russian policies, some exiled representatives of the conquered countries have endeavored to sketch out a system or systems of regional solidarity, as a means of recognizing and of overcoming some of the obvious handicaps which would beset the small states acting in isolation. Such a regional system of joint responsibility would enhance the capacity of the smaller nations for coordinated and even united action. It might thus temper the violence of their peoples' reaction against Nazi oppression, and might soften somewhat their natural demand that their own security be established through the complete and permanent subjugation of Germany. A system of regional groupings would, it is thought, diminish the post-war responsibilities to be asked of the extra-continental victors, and would thus make more palatable to them the idea of assuming at least a limited guarantee for post-war order in Europe.

The movement for regional consolidation has been led by the Polish and Czechoslovak governments-in-exile. The proposed Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation provides for a common policy in defense and foreign affairs, in tariffs, communications, and monetary problems. Although some provision is made for joint organs of deliberation and rule, the implementation of the Confederation would rest mainly on a close coordination between the two governments, rather than on a federal union of the two states. The Greek and Yugoslav governments-in-exile have also adopted a plan for post-war cooperation, which provides principally for the coordination of defense and foreign policy.

At the New York conference of the International

Labor Office, in November, 1941, the delegations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece presented a joint declaration proposing a close coordination of their respective national policies in the post-war period. As a further step in this direction, the four delegations, on January 7, 1942, set up a joint planning board, called "The Central and East European Planning Board." Its aim is, through national and joint studies, to prepare the way for the post-war reconstruction of East Central Europe. Such proposals and agreements for regional associations and for regional planning go considerably beyond the functions assumed by the economic sections of the Little and Balkan Ententes. Yet they are subject to some of the same handicaps as their precursors.

In any arrangement short of a complete regional federation, the medium-sized and small nations which lie between the Germans and Italians on the west and the Soviet Union on the east will again be exposed to the political maneuverings of outside powers. Present projects for regional solidarity, of necessity, leave out of account Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; it is doubtful whether these three satellites of the Axis could be won to sincere post-war cooperation in a regional bloc by any policy enforced unilaterally by the present four-power grouping and without the support and the incentives which could be furnished by the major states among the victors. In addition, Austria's role would be decisive for the stability of any East Central European confederation or bloc; the post-war conditions and aspirations of Austria are most difficult to predict.

The inability of the Scandinavian states to stand together, closely united as they have been by cultural and historic ties and by a community of outlook, must make one cautious in supposing that the far more diverse and divided states of East Central Europe can form a close and harmonious bloc even with the support of Britain and America. True, the indescribably bitter experiences of the last four years may possibly be laying a foundation for post-war teamwork. Even granted such a psychological basis, no bloc of East Central European states would be powerful enough, in population, in its industrial strength, and in geographical unity, to stand up indefinitely against a revival of German expansionism, unless it were backed by a continent-wide system of security, supported in turn by definite responsibilities to be borne by outside powers, including Russia.

The organization of a strong East Central European bloc would still fall short of providing for the security of the smaller states of Western Europe, including Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. That problem might conceivably be solved by reviving the military power of France, backed, as was projected in 1919, by definite commitments from Britain and

the United States. It is doubtful, however, whether the power of France would be adequate to carry such sweeping responsibilities, exceeding those which she bore between 1919 and 1939. The combination of a French-led West European coalition with an East Central European bloc would presumably hold Germany in check for a long time. However, its stability would rest on certain, none too solid premises: the perpetuation of the military spirit, or its revival, within the now subject countries, the maintenance of genuine solidarity among the non-German states of the continent, and the retention of the good-will and the support of the extra-continental victors.

A sketchy analysis of some proposed solutions for the problem of the security of the smaller nations of Europe has led back, in each case, to one cardinal uncertainty—the policies of the great extra-continental powers, Britain, Russia and the United States, toward the post-war order in Europe. The reordering of Europe on democratic principles will be, intellectually and politically, a far more difficult problem than the application of a primitive system like that of the Nazis. It will require the exercise of great qualities of mind and spirit, by leaders and peoples alike. Through it each people must be assured the enjoyment of its nationhood, the opportunity to realize and develop its own cultural and spiritual values. Each people must receive, within a limiting framework of over-all economic and political cooperation, the chance to secure its livelihood and to develop its resources. The psychosis of fear and revenge, which will otherwise dominate both victors and vanquished, must be gradually eliminated through steady and far-sighted treatment.

In terms of their culture and their way of life, the values of the smaller nations of Europe are naturally beyond price to their own peoples. Their contributions have also been, and will again be, of inestimable value to the development of Euro-American civilization as a whole. But the part which the medium-sized and small nations can play in meeting Europe's underlying need for political security is far smaller than the sum total of their populations and of their resources, both economic and cultural. The problem of the future of the smaller nations is primarily a problem for the wisdom and the strength of purpose of the world powers. After the overthrow of Hitler's slave-system, the smaller nations will look for guidance, in the first instance, to the British Commonwealth, to Russia, and to the United States—the three great Euro-American powers, which, for their own salvation, must now bear the burden of extricating Europe from the grip of Hitler's tyranny.

Author in This Issue

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UNCONSCIOUS FASCISM

A WEEKLY well known in one of our smaller cities discusses the unsatisfied need for an intelligent Congress. That need is obvious. An intelligent Congress is of vital importance in a time of crisis. The journal goes on to note, however, that the present unintelligent Congress is unfortunately representative of the people. It is the people who lack intelligence, a statement bolstered by army reports on draftees and the like. The remedy for this distressing situation is apparently suggested by the strangely naive but strangely disturbing remark, "There is no sound reason why the elite of the nation should allow themselves to be governed by the riff-raff."

Much as we have at times condemned Congress for short-sightedness, stupidity and cowardice, we had never thought of it as being or as representing the riff-raff. We have always known that part of the responsibility for the present situation is that those whom the editor calls "the elite" have not been willing to undertake political careers. For two or three generations, success in America has meant money. Men have preferred to govern by lobbies rather than to enter the political arena openly.

But what we are concerned about at the moment is not the remedies proposed (limiting suffrage and the like) but the surface meaning of the sentence we have quoted. There is the quiet assumption that the bulk of the people are riff-raff. There is the conclusion that the only thing to do about it is for the self-chosen "elite" to govern them. Many people belonging to the "elite" certainly feel that way. This feeling crops up in private conversations. It is implicit in attacks on labor "which must be put in its place." Silver Shirts and others of the same type are frank about it. But one seldom sees it in otherwise loyal and intelligent quarters stated so baldly as in this comment on the elite and the riff-raff. The implications are obvious although the writer probably never has seen them. The philosophy of democracy, he seems to say, is but a veneer. The battle today is not for world freedom and the lifting of the masses. The Nazi and Fascist philosophy is right. The battle is for power. The world belongs to the strong. The editor would be horrified at such an interpretation. He is sure he is a loyal American. He believes in democracy. But there, nevertheless, are his words.

There is no need to expound these implications at length nor any use in getting excited about it. What is important is to note how words like these, thoughtless as they may be, reveal the need of emphasizing again and yet again the danger of this kind of fascism, utterly undemocratic but also utterly unchristian as it is, creeping in and getting more and more influence. Fascism is of course age old. It is new only in name. Like National Socialism and the New

Order, like Japan's Co-Prosperity Sphere for Asia, it means as we have said that the world belongs to the strong and that it is to be ruled from the top down. This may be tempered by phrases like the New Order. It may be made more palatable by philosophy or religion. The philosophers of Plato's Republic are certainly more desirable rulers than a "gang" of Sparta's military. The divine right of the Bourbons and the Stuarts has a dignity even on the scaffold which sets it apart from the vulgar power lust of Hitler and the Gestapo. The spiritual appeal of the Pope and the Roman hierarchy still leaves a measure of freedom. It is hard for men listening to that appeal to realize that in the end the freedom of the rest of life cannot be maintained if the spirit of man is ruled from the top down, by an authoritarian institution even if the institution, like those Kings of earlier days, believes it rules by divine right.

All these systems, unlike in so many ways, share the same fundamental principle. Men are to be governed; not to govern or learn to govern themselves and their rulers will be self-chosen. The divine right is that of the strong.

That is not the doctrine of the Church of Christ, but it is the doctrine of many an otherwise good Christian. They nod with approval at the sentences about the elite and the riff-raff. They denounce and fear what they call radicalism in the pulpit because they do not believe that labor unions have anything like the place in God's world which belongs of right to management and capital. They listen to talk of limited suffrage with delight. They are satisfied with the most extreme measures against Japanese citizens. A clergyman refuses to sign a letter of sympathy (and only sympathy) to those being evacuated because "his laymen would not like it."

All that is perfectly familiar. Perfectly familiar too is the subtlety of the appeal. Indeed it is often perfectly honest for it rests upon a confusion between the necessity of experts, that is of knowledge and intelligence in leadership and the self-appointed leadership of the strong, the privileged, the self-constituted elite.

But the point of all these rambling remarks is that this problem is for the Churches one of imperative necessity. They cannot support and nurture democracy in the nation unless they have it themselves. Their people, their boards, their governing bodies, their leaders—it is with them we must start. The Churches have an arduous task. Self revelation is part of it. They must help Christians to look into their own souls and see where they really stand. Conversion is the other part of it. "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve." If the democratic nations are to win the peace, Fascism among Christians must be rooted out.

EDWARD L. PARSONS.

A MAN LIKE YOU

(This little story from South America is meant as an answer to one of our correspondents who suggested in a recent issue that it is naïve to believe that soldiers can fight without hating.)

THE time was late December, 1935. The place was a "Salon de Te" in Asunción, capital of Paraguay, where I sat across the table from Damién, an eighteen-year-old Paraguayan soldier. Damién was returning to his barracks after a Christmas furlough in his lovely native village of Piribebuy where I, too, had enjoyed a holiday.

I was treating the lad to the first real "tea room" experience of his life. We were speaking of the war, which was still in the armistice stage; of his year of fighting in the Gran Chaco; of the Bolivian prisoners, some 35,000 of them, awaiting the completion of guarantees acceptable to Paraguay, so that they could return to their homes, most of them on Bolivia's Altiplano.

"What do you think Paraguay should do about the prisoners, Damién?" I asked the question which in those days was on the lips of almost every one of Paraguay's friendly neighbors and about which arguments waxed hot.

"Oh, señorita, I think we should send them home."

"Why?"

"Because, señorita, they have been a long time away from their homes. Most of the prisoners in Piribebuy have been there for three years."

"Are they not well treated?"

"Oh, yes, señorita, do you not remember how the Comisario explained to you that we have given them the best of care? But it does not make us happy to see them suffer."

"Then if they are well treated, why do they suffer, Damién?"

"Every man, señorita, is unhappy when he is far from home."

"Damién, you were far from home for a whole year. You have had a hard year, have you not?"

"Yes, señorita, and I am very anxious to be demobilized so that I can go home and help my mother. I want to repay her sacrifice in looking after my little brothers and sisters while I have been in the war." (There were twelve of them!)

"You have had many experiences, Damién?"

"Yes, señorita, it was not too easy. You see, I saw things and learned things which I did not know existed. Do you know, señorita, I had to make men prisoners. When I took prisoners they fell down on their knees and begged me not to kill them. Then I always used to say, 'Man, get up! Man, why do you pray to me? Man, I am a man just like you!'"

"Yes, Damién, I see."

"It is a terrible thing when people fear you, señorita."

"Damién, was the Chaco worth it?"

"Señorita, the Chaco was not worth it perhaps, but freedom—that is 'otra cosa'; freedom, 'en mi opinión' is worth all it costs."

Clara S. Roe

Miss Clara S. Roe is Secretary of the World Emergency Fund of the Y. W. C. A.

The World Church: News and Notes

Christianity or Communism

The Bishop of Hongkong, writing in *The Student Movement* on the situation in the Chinese Universities, gives the following explanation of the influence which the Chinese brand of Communism is exerting upon students:

"Communism is a Christian heresy, as Mohammedanism is a Christian heresy. But Communism is more like Arianism than like Islam. . . . God and Christ, says the Communist, are not the same stuff." God is the great irresistible steam roller of the economic process, and Christ was a good Communist.

"So in China today there is an accord between the Communists and the Christians—and a deep sympathy between them. And many Christian students have joined this Christian heresy, because, like all heresies, it simplifies the mystery of life and provides a unity, a balance on life's tight-rope, which is less bewildering than the tension of the Christian religion. It carries you along with it, without quite the same stern challenge to make

your own mistakes. It satisfies our Lord's command: 'This DO and thou shalt live'; though it leaves Him to hang alone upon the Cross, and puts you out of reach of the incredible experiences of Easter Day.

"The issue then in the Chinese Universities, the issue that matters more than Biology or Pragmatism or Socialistic views on Banking, is 'Shall I be a Christian or a Communist—or just remain a Chinese?'

I. C. P. I. S. Geneva.

Racial Discrimination in German Church

The insistence of the Nazis that there can be no communion between the races in the Christian church has been implemented not only by the prohibition of attendance of Germans at Polish church services but they have also forbidden German priests to hear confessions in Polish. Since there are a million Poles in enforced labor in Germany, this prohibition has destroyed their contact with their church. Cardinal Bertram of Breslau

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finally secured permission for priests to read a Polish translation of the German text of the prayers of penitence. But the German government has now added a new restriction. Religious services for Poles in Germany have now been restricted to two hours in the first Sunday of each month.

Help for Refugees in France

The food shortage in unoccupied France is having particularly serious effects upon the refugees. The clothing situation is equally disquieting; many refugees, after several years in camps, have nothing but rags to wear. The camps now contain only about 14,000 people as against 40,000 a year ago. This reduction is due to several factors, among them emigration, release to homes established by private welfare organizations, the transfer of most able-bodied men to foreign labor battalions. The material and moral situation of the 50,000 or more men in foreign labor is little better than that in the camps, and the wide dispersion of these groups renders effective service very difficult. There is also much distress among the many refugees who are living in complete isolation in many parts of unoccupied France.

In this situation the extensive efforts of a score of private relief and welfare organizations working in unoccupied France is of the utmost importance. The Christian organizations which are playing their part in this work comprise: the World's Committee of the YMCAs, World's YWCA, CIMADE (Refugees Committee of the movements which collaborate in the Conseil Protestant de la jeunesse française: YMCA, YWCA, S.C.M., Protestant Scouts and Guides), and Chaplaincy Service for Refugees.

The World's Committee of YMCAs and the World's YWCA are assisting the CIMADE Committee in carrying out its religious and general educational program

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and social work in the various camps and Foyers by collecting and transmitting funds contributed for this purpose by their various National Associations, and by providing advice and suggestions regarding the development of this work.

Shintoism and Christianity

During the days of peace the Japanese government had two interpretations of Shintoism. One declared that it was not a religion but a form of patriotism. The other insisted upon its religious character. Since the war, the government is pressing a single interpretation upon all Japanese, including Christians. It now declares that Shintoism is "the perfect religion, the religion of religions" and insists that the slogan "eight corners under one roof" means that all the peoples ruled by the Emperor must enjoy the blessings of Shintoism. This new pressure will place the Christian church in Japan in a very difficult position.

Church Leaders Arrested

Several outstanding leaders of the Dutch Churches have been arrested during the last few weeks. The arrest of Professor Alders of Groningen University, well-known as a theologian and leader in the Ecumenical Movement, who is over 70 years of age, and Professor Paul Scholten, outstanding lay leader and who has also been active in the Ecumenical Movement, have especially made a profound impression.

I. C. P. I. S. Geneva

Taxation and Charity

Many charities in America which are greatly concerned and baffled about the possible effect of heavy taxation upon gifts to charity will be reassured to know that in Britain, where charitable gifts before the war amounted from seventy to a hundred million dollars per year, a total of \$104,000,000 was reached in the year 1940-41. Of this amount five and a half million was for Russian aid.

The fact that higher surtaxes reduce the actual cost of charitable gifts to taxpayers, obviously counteracts the tendency of diminished incomes to prompt diminished benevolences.

Religious Conference in South Africa

The Christian Council of South Africa, comprising the Anglican, Baptist, Congregational, Lutheran, Methodist and Presbyterian Churches will hold a conference in July in which the difficult race problem will be considered. The conference will be attended by Europeans, Africans, and Indians. The Dutch Church does not belong to the Council because it objects to the stand which the organization has taken on the race problem, and to the mixed racial character of the conference.